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The soft power of India
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Abstract
India’s soft power is on the rise, in parallel with its economic power as one of the fastest 
growing major economies in the world. This chapter discusses India’s soft power within four 
domains: firstly, the democratic strengths of India, a particular distinction among the BRICS 
countries. As the world’s largest democracy, India has retained and arguably strengthened 
democracy in a multi-lingual, multi-racial and multi-religious society. The second domain 
examines the diasporic dimension of India’s international presence, increasingly viewed by 
Indian government and corporates as a vital resource for its soft power. As the world’s largest 
English-language speaking diaspora, the Indian presence is visible across the globe. The third 
domain focuses on the emergence of an Indian internet – part of the Indian government’s 
‘Digital India’ initiative, launched in 2015 - and its potential for becoming the world’s largest 
‘open’ internet. The chapter argues that, with the government of Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi the push for digital commerce and communication is likely to increase. Already home 
to the world’s second largest internet population, its creative and cultural industries, notably 
Bollywood, have the potential to circulate across various digital domains, resulting in 
globalized production, distribution and consumption practices. However, the chapter argues 
that these three domains of soft power will remain ineffective until India is able to eliminate 
its pervasive and persistent poverty, afflicting large number of its citizens.
Keywords
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O poder brando da Índia
Daya Thussu1 
Resumo
O poder brando (soft power) da Índia está em ascensão paralelamente ao seu poder econômico, 
sendo uma das principais economias em crescimento no mundo. Este trabalho discute o 
poder brando da Índia em quatro domínios: primeiro, os pontos fortes democráticos da Índia, 
uma distinção particular entre os países do BRICS. O segundo aspecto examina a dimensão 
diaspórica da presença internacional do país, cada vez mais vista pelo governo e pelas 
empresas indianas como um recurso vital para o seu poder brando. Como a maior diáspora 
de língua inglesa do mundo, a presença indiana é visível em todo o mundo. O terceiro domínio 
se concentra no surgimento de uma internet indiana – parte da iniciativa Índia Digital do 
governo, lançada em 2015 – e seu potencial para se tornar a maior internet aberta do mundo. 
Por fim, o artigo argumenta que, com o governo do primeiro-ministro Narendra Modi, o 
impulso para o comércio e a comunicação digital provavelmente aumentará. Afinal, além da 
sua cultura e criatividade, o país abriga a segunda maior população da internet do mundo.
Palavras-chave
O poder Brando da Ìndia; Diáspora; Democraicia; Índia Digital, BRICS
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Introduction
While India’s global influence has a long and complex history, this chapter 
suggests that, as India emerges as a major economic power (on purchasing power 
parity terms, it is the world’s third largest economy), the country’s cultural power 
will also grow. This process is also underpinned by its 25-million strong diaspora, 
seen by Modi government as a key strategic resource for promoting the country’s 
soft power. From mobile telephony to online communication, India has witnessed 
a revolution in the production and distribution of its cultural products, as well as a 
steady growth of Indic ideas – ranging from sustainable living and alternative lifestyles 
to celebratory religiosity and multilingualism – and now reaching all corners of an 
increasingly digitized globe. The chapter argues, however, that the populist streak in 
policy restricts the potential of a global India, especially since the pluralism for which 
India is known, is increasingly under strain in the majoritarian discourse of current 
domestic and foreign policy. 
Even before Narendra Modi was elected Prime Minister in 2014, the populist 
politician from India’s western province of Gujarat could claim international 
recognition, especially among large sections of India’s 25-million strong diaspora. As 
Chief Minister of Gujarat, Modi had travelled to various countries, addressing dozens 
of meetings where members of the diaspora were present in large numbers. He had 
visited China, too, to seek investment for his state – printing red business cards 
in Mandarin to please his potential Chinese investors. This pragmatic and media-
savvy attitude can be seen in the approach of the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party 
government in India’s public diplomacy, wooing the diaspora through mega events 
in the world’s major cities, promoting the cultural and religious aspects of India and 
emphasizing India’s democratic, demographic and digital strengths as one of the 
world’s fastest growing large economies.
Since 2013, India has been the world’s third largest economy, behind China and 
the United States, on the basis of purchasing-power parity, while in overall GDP terms, 
its $2.6 trillion economy became the fifth largest, surpassing Britain in 2019 (IMF, 2019). 
Nevertheless, the country is still home to the world’s largest number of people living 
in extreme poverty. This change in India’s global status has coincided with the relative 
economic decline of the West, creating the opportunity for an emerging power, such 
as India to participate in global governance structures hitherto dominated by the US-
led Western alliance (ACHARYA, 2018; CULL, 2019). Given its history as the only major 
democracy that did not blindly follow the West during the Cold War years, pursuing 
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a nonaligned foreign policy, India has the potential now to take up a more significant 
leadership role. Despite growing economic and strategic relations with Washington, 
it maintains close ties with other major and emerging powers. India’s presence at the 
Group of 77 developing nations and at the G-20 leading economies of the world has 
been effective in articulating a Southern perspective on global affairs. India is also 
a key member of the BRICS grouping of countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and 
South Africa), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization as well as the Commonwealth.
Parallel to its rising economic power, is the growing global awareness and 
appreciation of India’s soft power—its mass media, celebratory religiosity (yoga and 
Ayurveda) and popular culture (THAROOR, 2008; BLAREL, 2012; THAROOR, 2012; 
THUSSU, 2013; KUGIEL, 2017). Joseph Nye in his 2004 book Soft Power: The Means to 
Success in World Politics suggests that soft power is an integral part of foreign policy, 
especially for states seeking to ‘incorporate the soft dimensions into their strategies 
for wielding power’ (NYE, 2004, p. 1). Its role in foreign policy is important precisely 
because ‘in behavioural terms, simply put, soft power is attractive power’ (IBID, p. 6), 
pursued in order to influence the behaviour of other states.
How much such ‘attractive power’ does India possess? India’s soft power has 
a civilizational dimension to it: the Indic civilization, dating back more than 5,000 
years, being one of the major cultural formations in the world, with wide-ranging 
influences from religion and philosophy, arts and architecture to language, literature, 
trade and travel. As the point of origin of four of the world’s religions – Hinduism, 
Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism – and as the place where every major faith, with the 
exception of Shintoism and Confucianism, has coexisted for millennia, India offers a 
unique and syncretized religious discourse.
The dissemination of Hindu and Buddhist ideas across Asia is well documented: 
it is no coincidence that the official airline of Indonesia, the world’s largest Muslim 
country, is named Garuda, the Sanskrit name for the mount of Hindu God Vishnu. 
The Indian contribution to Islamic thought (and via that to European intellectual 
culture) on mathematics, astronomy, and other physical and metaphysical sciences is 
widely recognized. India’s soft power in historical terms was directed not towards the 
West but to Asia. India’s cultural influence across East and Southeast Asia during the 
early centuries of the Christian era was spread through the dispersion of Hinduism 
and Buddhism and thus the millennia-old relationship between India and the rest 
of Asia has a strong cultural and communication dimension. Buddhism was at the 
heart of this interaction, with the widest dissemination of ideas emanating from 
what constitutes India today, and remains a powerful link between the Indic and the 
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Chinese civilizations. Narratives on Buddha’s life and teachings are still a cultural 
referent in much of Asia, while traces of Indic languages, cuisine, dance, and other 
art forms survive in parts of Southeast Asia, notably in Indonesia. Two of the world’s 
other great religions – Christianity and Islam – also have long associations with India. 
Some of the earliest Christian communities were established in India: St. Thomas is 
supposed to be buried in Chennai and one of the world’s oldest mosques is also located 
in India – in Kerala, where Jewish communities have lived for millennia. Adding to 
this legacy is India’s long and continuing encounter with European modernity and its 
contribution to a distinctive worldview epitomized by leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, 
the apostle of non-violence and tolerance – whose thoughts influenced such leaders 
as Martin Luther King and Nelson Mandela, prompting scholars to speak of a ‘pax-
Gandhiana’ (PAREL, 2016). This rare combination of a civilization which has strong 
Hindu-Buddhist foundations, centuries of Islamic influence, and integration with 
Western institutions and ideas, gives India cultural resources to deal with the diverse, 
globalized and complex realities of the twenty-first century.
The Diasporic Dimension
Another key dimension of India’s growing global soft-power profile is its extended 
and increasingly visible diaspora, especially in the United States, where an estimated 
4.6 million people of Indian origin live (KAPUR, 2010; CHAKRAVORTY; KAPUR; SINGH, 
2017). The most articulate and effective manifestation of this soft power attribute is 
the growing presence of members of the Indian diaspora in influential positions at 
Ivy League universities, international media and multilateral organizations, as well as 
among transnational corporations. Member of the Indian diaspora, scattered around 
the globe, have excelled in many spheres of life and enriched the cultural, economic 
and intellectual experience of countries such as the US and Britain (KAPUR, 2010; 
THUSSU, 2013; CHAKRAVORTY; KAPUR; SINGH, 2017).  The more prosperous sections 
of this diaspora – mostly based in the West - have become an important component 
in foreign policy priorities for Modi. He has underlined the need to further strengthen 
the linkages between India and its diaspora, as indicated in his various stage-managed 
‘town-hall’ events, full of razzmatazz, notably the 2014 mega show in New York’s 
Madison Square Garden as well as the 2015 rally at London’s Wembley Stadium, and 
most recently, the Houston rally with US President Donald Trump in September 2019. 
These shows were exceptionally well attended and received wide media coverage. 
Indian corporations, too, are keen to engage with the diasporic elites to further their 
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own interests. 
In a globalized and interconnected world, diasporas can be a vital strategic 
instrument and channel of communication to further foreign policy goals, depending 
on their economic and political influence within the centres of global power (RANA, 
2009; KAPUR 2010). It is no coincidence that two of the world’s top digital corporations 
in 2019 were led by men who studied for their first university degrees in India: Satya 
Nadella, the CEO of Microsoft and Sundar Pichai, chief executive of Google. Such ‘soft 
power resources’ are being deployed by India’s government, in collaboration with 
increasingly globalizing Indian industries, to project India as an investment-friendly, 
pro-market democracy. 
As India’s international profile has grown in recent decades, many members 
of its diaspora are reconnecting with the homeland. Although Modi has prioritized 
engagement with the diaspora, he is benefitting from steps taken by his predecessors, 
especially Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, who headed the pro-business BJP-
led coalition government in 1998. Vajpayee created the annual celebration Pravasi 
Bharatiya Diwas (Day of the Non-Resident Indian) on 9 January, symbolically chosen 
to mark the return of Mahatma Gandhi to India from South Africa in 1914 to lead the 
Indian nationalist movement. The phrase ‘Vishwa Bharati’ (Global Indian) was also 
coined during his time. Vajpayee set up the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs in 
2004, another milestone in this diasporic diplomacy.
The Public Diplomacy Division within the Ministry of External Affairs MEA is 
also involved in organizing soft-power related events abroad in collaboration with 
the Indian Council for Cultural Relations (ICCR), the nodal government agency 
responsible for India’s soft power projection that regularly organizes ‘Festivals of 
India’ around the world.
 
The Popular Dimension
Official ‘Festivals of India’ that focus on India’s traditional cultures have had 
limited success as they are perceived, quite accurately, as government-sponsored 
initiatives catering to a discerning global elite. Much more effective in soft power 
terms is India’s privately-owned and -run popular film industry - Bollywood – the 
world’s largest film industry in terms of the number of films produced. Indian movies 
are watched and enjoyed in large parts of the world, from the Middle East and North 
Africa to Central and Southeast Asia (GERA ROY, 2012; SCHAEFER; KARAN, 2013; 
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SWAMINATHAN, 2017; ATHIQUE, 2019, AMONG OTHERS). Since formally receiving the 
status of an industry by the Indian government in 2000, authorizing banks to provide 
loans to filmmakers and insurers to insure film financiers, the Indian film industry 
has become a source of export revenue, as well as an instrument for promoting India’s 
soft power. This has also helped encourage foreign investors to engage with the Indian 
entertainment industry, resulting in growing investment from the telecom, software 
and media sectors. The ensuing corporatization and the synergies this created made 
it possible for Bollywood content to be available on multiple platforms - satellite, 
cable, online and mobile - and help formulate a complex, globalized production, 
distribution and consumption system (PUNATHAMBEKAR, 2013; SWAMINATHAN, 
2017).
Indian film exports have witnessed a steady increase in the past two decades 
and industry estimates suggest that the entertainment and media sector in India was 
worth $19 billion in 2018 and was expected to grow as its markets widen and further 
globalize (FICCI-KPMG, 2017; FICCI/EY REPORT, 2018). The globalization of Indian 
films can also be witnessed in the trend of non-Indian actors appearing in Indian films, 
most recently Chinese actress Zhu Zhu as the leading lady in the 2017 film Tubelight, 
set against the backdrop of the 1962 India-China border war. Increasingly Hollywood 
giants have expanded their involvement in India and entered into joint ventures with 
Indian companies to enter the Indian market and indeed the global market for Indian 
cinema. One notable example was Disney’s 2016 Bollywood production Dangal, which 
made $217 million in the international market, with China accounting for $178.3 million 
of this figure, making it the most successful Indian film internationally. The film was 
released in China in May 2017 dubbed into Mandarin as Shuajiao Baba (Let’s Wrestle, 
Dad!), and generated about five times its India earnings (YAU, 2018). Bollywood is also 
increasingly being watched not in theatres but on laptops and other mobile digital 
devices, with both Amazon Prime and Netflix having special rates for Indian films 
for the global audience. Yet the industry’s growth continues to be limited by various 
factors, including a poor communication infrastructure as well as piracy, which 
accounts for an annual loss of substantial revenues. (FICCI-KPMG, 2017; FICCI/EY 
REPORT 2018). 
Communicating Soft Power
Unlike the entertainment industry, Indian news and current affairs continue to 
be largely domestically oriented and therefore absent in the global news arena. As a 
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result, the capacity to communicate India’s cultural attributes to a globalized audience 
is largely underdeveloped. Of the countries with ambitions for a global role, India is 
the only one whose national broadcaster (Doordarshan) is not available in the major 
capitals of the world. Unlike non-English speaking countries such as China (CGTN), 
Russia (RT), Qatar (Al Jazeera English), Iran (Press TV) and Turkey (TRT-News), whose 
English-language 24/7 news networks are widely distributed around the world, the 
Indian viewpoint is notably missing in the global news sphere, at a time when news 
media are a key instrument of public diplomacy. 
While India’s English-language private news networks, such as NDTV 24x7, 
CNN-News 18, India Today Television, Times Now and WION (World is One News) are 
available globally, they have rarely ventured out of their diasporic constituencies. These 
networks do not appear to be interested in catering for an international news market. 
Instead, the international dimension of the commercial news channels functions 
primarily to reach to the global diasporic audience, who are perhaps more interested 
in coverage of India itself rather than broader international affairs. For a nation with a 
developed model of journalism and one of the world’s largest English-language news 
markets, it is an irony that Indian journalism is losing interest in the wider world at a time 
when Indian industry is increasingly globalizing and international engagement with 
India is growing across the globe. Despite its penchant for managing media messages 
and Modi’s personal reputation as a formidable communicator, his government has 
done little to address this shortcoming in India’s external communication strategy.
Digital Diplomacy
Where television has failed, will the internet succeed in communicating India’s 
soft power? India’s Ministry of External Affairs was one of the early adopters of social 
media platforms to connect with diasporic communities. Though MEA’s twitter 
account @IndianDiplomacy was set up in 2010, since Modi took over in 2014, the 
Ministry has been using social media more effectively, promoting a positive cultural 
narrative for ‘Brand India’. The MEA India Facebook page, created in 2012, is also 
widely followed in diplomatic and diasporic circles. It also maintains two You Tube 
channels and has accounts on various platforms including Instagram, Soundcloud, 
Flickr, LinkedIn as well as a Google+ channel.  India’s Foreign Missions have twitter 
accounts and Facebook pages. Such digital diplomacy has been spurred on by Modi’s 
own considerable social media presence.  Modi has used such digital connectivity to 
promote yoga as part of soft-power projection, in which his government has been very 
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active, as evidenced by the adoption of International Yoga Day by the United Nations 
on June 21. This required intense lobbying by the Modi government, gaining the 
support of 175 member states at the General Assembly for the resolution proposing an 
international day of yoga. Drawing on an ancient Hindu spiritual tradition to promote 
an Indian ‘alternative’ lifestyle fits in very well with a Hindu nationalist leader who is 
himself a devoted yoga enthusiast (MAZUMDAR, 2018; GAUTAM; DROOGAN, 2018). 
Encouraged by the $18 billion ‘Digital India’ initiative, launched by the Modi 
government in 2015, India is currently undergoing a digital transformation, making it 
home to the world’s largest ‘open’ internet (since the Chinese one is not open). In the 
last 15 years, India has seen an exceptional expansion in internet use, with an increase 
of nearly 7,000 per cent: at the turn of the century only 5.5 million Indians (with a 
penetration rate of 0.5 per cent of the population) were online; by 2019 that figure had 
grown exponentially to 600 million internet users (with a penetration rate of over 45 
per cent). 
This digital revolution is particularly significant in a country that boasts the 
largest population of young people in the world – more than 70 per cent of India’s 
population of 1.3 billion is below the age of 35. It will ensure that Indic ideas will travel 
across global digital superhighways in large volume, strengthening the already well-
established connection between India and its diaspora, as well as wider international 
publics. As noted by a commentator, ‘India benefits from its traditional practices (from 
Ayurveda to yoga, both accelerating in popularity across the globe) and the transformed 
image of the country created by its thriving diaspora. Information technology has 
made its own contribution to India’s soft power’ (THAROOR, 2012, p. 284). Given 
Modi’s energy, his astute use of social media and his formidable communication skills, 
the Indian Prime Minster has endeared himself to large sections of this constituency 
(TANDON, 2016).
However, the deployment of diasporic and digital diplomatic resources do not 
alone make a country attractive on the world stage; these assets need to be translated 
into influencing the behaviour of other states and stakeholders, requiring a concerted 
effort by policy makers (MUKHERJEE, 2014). Modi’s ‘faith-based’ diplomacy, 
promoting, and some would say, appropriating Buddhism is particularly pronounced. 
As mentioned earlier in the chapter, Buddhism was founded in India and remains the 
most enduring and powerful idea to be identified with the region called India today 
and connects Indian culture with countries across Asia. It is not without symbolic 
significance that the first foreign visit Modi made after being elected Prime Minister 
in 2014 was to Buddhist Bhutan. Since then, in his official visits to Asian nations such 
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as Nepal, Japan, China, Mongolia and South Kore, he has repeatedly invoked Buddhism 
(MAZUMDAR, 2018). Although according to the 2011 census, merely 0.7 per cent of the 
Indian population were Buddhists, Modi’s government declared ‘Buddha Purnima’ 
(Buddha’s birthday) an official holiday to be celebrated each year. With its focus on 
peace and non-violence, Buddhism is seen as a useful soft power tool for India, which 
has traditionally projected itself as a peace-loving nation (despite being a nuclear 
power, the world’s largest importer of arms and having the third largest armed forces 
in the world). Emphasizing the millennium-old cultural and communication links 
with other Asian nations, the Modi government has propounded the idea of ‘sanskriti 
evam sabhyata’ (culture and civilization) as a core principle for promoting India’s 
image globally.
One area which deserves greater emphasis is India’s successful tryst with 
democracy - ‘the world’s largest democracy.’ India has an electorate of 700 million 
(larger than the combined number of voters in the US and Western Europe) and 
more than 100 registered political parties. This largely successful experience is 
unprecedented outside the ‘democratic West.’ India’s democratic record - electing 
Modi, who is never shy of publicly admitting his very humble background, being the 
son of a ‘Chaiwala’ (tea seller) to the highest office in the land - coupled with a secular 
and federal political infrastructure, in place for nearly seven decades, is a unique 
experience in encompassing and accommodating different ethnic, religious, and 
linguistic stakeholders. 
Despite the dire predictions of many commentators at the time of independence 
from Britain in 1947, that a country mired in poverty, ignorance, and illiteracy could not 
sustain a democratic system and would descend into autocratic dictatorship, India has 
proved that this can be achieved (SEN, 2005). The scale and scope of the Indian electoral 
process should offer great opportunities for other developing countries to learn from 
the Indian experience, ranging from understanding voter behaviour among a largely 
poor electorate as well as the importance of an autonomous and effective Election 
Commission. Beyond the electoral aspects of democracy, India also demonstrates 
that a unified nation state can function without a single language or one religion but 
as a socially diverse, culturally plural, multilingual, and multi-faith country. Such 
heterogeneity may be India’s major strength in a globalized world, where the capacity 
to deal with diversity is likely to grow in importance (THUSSU, 2013). Unlike China, 
India’s soft power initiatives are not centrally managed by the government. Indeed, the 
government takes a backseat while India’s creative and cultural industry, its religions 
and spirituality, as well as its active diaspora and corporations help promote Indian 
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interests abroad, a phenomenon likely to accelerate in an increasingly globalized and 
networked world. 
How Effective is India’s Soft Power?
The intangible nature of soft power makes it hard, if not impossible, to measure. 
To make India a more attractive country, especially among other developing nations, 
would require India’s policymakers to seriously address the daily deprivation that 
millions of its citizens suffer. Despite its admirable economic performance in the 
past two decades, India is still home to more poor people than the whole of Sub-
Saharan Africa. On virtually every internationally recognized index, India remains 
very low in the ranking of nations: from child malnutrition to infant mortality, access 
to basic health and education; to status and security for women (KOHLI, 2012; DRÈZE; 
SEN, 2013). The contrast is especially stark with its BRICS partner China, a one-party, 
authoritarian state, which has been able to raise 700 million people out of poverty 
in the past two decades—an exceptional record by any historical or contemporary 
standard. The exponents of India’s soft power must consider why India’s example of 
a multicultural democracy has not been generally appreciated by other developing 
countries, many of which view, with admiration if not awe, the Chinese model of 
development as worth emulating.  India continues to be seen outside India as a nation 
of extreme poverty, social inequalities and communal strife. 
The Modi government’s reluctance to engage more fully with India’s 180 
million Muslims – the world’s largest minority – is a sign of policy limitation. The 
emphasis in promoting India’s Buddhist and Hindu legacy is in striking contrast with 
not highlighting positive aspects of India’s Islamic legacy: had British imperialism 
not divided India in 1947, it would have been the world’s largest Muslim country, in 
terms of population. The fact that an exceptionally small number of Indian Muslims 
(estimated at a few dozen) have volunteered to take part in Al Qaeda or ISIS extremism 
(as against thousands of Western-based Muslims who fought with these groups against 
the Western forces in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria) should have given Modi’s public 
diplomacy enough ammunition to project India as home to a tolerant version of Islam 
contributing to a ‘dialogue’ rather than ‘clash’ of civilizations.
Apart from ideological reasons, prompted by a majoritarian mindset, efforts 
to promote India’s soft power are also hampered by the rather limited resource base 
of its diplomatic infrastructure: the country has only 940 diplomats serving in 169 
missions and consulates across the globe: in comparison the figure for China is 7,500. 
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On the recommendation of a 2016 report of the Parliamentary Standing 
Committee on External Affairs, the MEA has developed a ‘soft power matrix’ to 
measure the effectiveness of India’s soft power outreach. This matrix, inspired by the 
London-based international public relations firm Portland Communications, which, 
in conjunction with the University of Southern California School of Public Diplomacy, 
publishes an annual ‘soft power index’, indicates the growing corporatization of public 
communication across the globe associated with the dominant neoliberal ideology. 
The Indian policy elite, like their counterparts in many other developing countries, 
seem to have adapted the market mantra of ‘branding’ nations and cultures. 
A relatively new concept, which emerged in the 1990s in the West, nation 
branding is rooted within the discipline of marketing and situated within the 
subfield of ‘place marketing,’ applying techniques traditionally used by transnational 
corporations to promote countries as products for favourable foreign investment or to 
challenge or redress media and cultural stereotypes associated with many developing 
countries. A country of India’s size, scale and substance should not have to be so 
instrumentalist in its approach. Beyond populist and majoritarian considerations, 
Modi and his mandarins should recognize that India’s soft power will only be effective 
internationally when the country is able to substantially reduce, if not eliminate, the 
pervasive and persistent poverty in which a majority of its citizens live. If this could 
be achieved within a multi-cultural and multi-lingual democracy, then India would 
indeed offer a new developmental model and, together with a more effective public 
diplomacy, its status as a major civilizational and economic power would receive its 
due appreciation around the world.
As one commentator notes: ‘India remains in a transitory phase where its 
hard power is yet to become preponderant even regionally to the point where it 
can meaningfully project its soft power in order to create a political environment 
conducive to its international goals’ (MUKHERJEE, 2014, p. 55).
References
ACHARYA, Amitav. The End of American World Order. Second edition, Cambridge: 
Polity, 2018.
ATHIQUE, Adrian. Soft power, culture and modernity: Responses to Bollywood 
films in Thailand and the Philippines. International Communication Gazette, 
v.81, n. 5, p.470-489, 2019. Disponível em: <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/
abs/10.1177/1748048518802234>. Acesso em: 7 abr. 2020.
Da
ya
 T
hu
ss
u
Juiz de Fora, PPGCOM – UFJF, v. 14, n. 1, p. 111-124, jan./abr. 2020 123
BLAREL, Nicolas. India’s Soft Power: From Potential to Reality?. In IDEAS Reports 
– Special Reports, KITCHEN, Nicholas (ed.). SR010. LSE IDEAS, Londres: London 
School of Economics and Political Science, 2012. 
CHAKRAVORTY, Sanjoy; KAPUR, Devesh; SINGH, Nirvikar. The Other One Percent: 
Indians in America. Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2017.
CULL, Nicholas. Public Diplomacy: Foundations for Global Engagement in the 
Digital Age. Cambridge: Polity, 2019.
DRÈZE, Jean; SEN, Amartya. An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013.
FICCI/KPMG REPORT. Media for the Masses: The Promise Unfolds - FICCI/KPMG 
Indian Media and Entertainment Industry Report 2017. Mumbai: Federation of 
Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry/KPMG India, 2017.
FICCI/EY Report. Re-imagining India’s M&E Sector. Mumbai: Federation of Indian 
Chambers of Commerce and Industry/EY India, 2018.
GAUTAM, Aavriti; DROOGAN, Julian. Yoga soft power: How flexible 
is the posture?. The Journal of International Communication, v. 24, 
n.1, p. 18-36, 2018. Disponível em: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/
abs/10.1080/13216597.2017.1388829?journalCode=rico20>. Acesso em: 8 abr. 2020. 
GERA ROY, Anjali (ed.). The Magic of Bollywood: At Home and Abroad. Nova Delhi: 
Sage, 2012.
GOVERNMENT OF INDIA. Annual Report of the Ministry of External Affairs. Nova 
Delhi: Government of India Press, 2020.
IMF. World Economic Outlook, April. Washington: International Monetary Fund, 
2019.
KAPUR, Davesh. Diaspora, Development, and Democracy: The Domestic Impact of 
International Migration from India. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010.
KOHLI, Atul. Poverty Amid Plenty in the New India. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2012.
KUGIEL, Patryk. India’s Soft Power: Foreign Policy Strategy. Londres Routledge, 
2017.
MAZUMDAR, Arijit. India’s soft power diplomacy under the Modi administration: 
Buddhism, diaspora and yoga. Asian Affairs, v.49, n. 3, p. 468-491, 2018. Disponível 
em: <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/03068374.2018.1487696>. Acesso 
em: 7 abr. 2020.
Juiz de Fora, PPGCOM – UFJF, v. 14, n. 1, p. 111-124, jan./abr. 2020 124
Th
e 
so
ft
 p
ow
er
 o
f I
nd
ia
MUKHERJEE, Rohan. The false promise of India’s soft power. Geopolitics, History, 
and International Relations, v. 6, n. 1,p. 46-62, 2014. Disponível em: <https://www.
researchgate.net/publication/256057428_The_False_Promise_of_India’s_Soft_
Power>. Acesso em: 7 abr. 2020.
NYE, Joseph. Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, Nova York: Public 
Affairs, 2004. 
PAREL, Anthony. Pax Gandhiana: The Political Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi.
Nova York: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
PUNATHAMBEKAR, Aswin. From Bombay to Bollywood: The Making of a Global 
Media Industry. Nova York: New York University Press, 2013.
RANA, Kishan. India’s Diaspora Diplomacy. Hague Journal of Diplomacy, v. 4, n. 3, p. 
361-72, 2009.  Disponível em: <https://brill.com/view/journals/hjd/4/3/article-p361_6.
xml?language=en>. Acesso em: 7 abr. 2020. 
SCHAEFER, David; KARAN, Kavita (eds.). Bollywood and Globalization: The Global 
Power of Popular Hindi Cinema. Londres: Routledge, 2013. 
SEN, Amartya. The Argumentative Indian. Londres: Penguin, 2005.
SWAMINATHAN, Roopa. Bollywood Boom: India’s Rise as a Soft Power. Nova Delhi: 
Penguin, 2017.
TANDON, Aakriti. Transforming the Unbound Elephant to the Lovable Asian Hulk: 
Why is Modi Leveraging India’s Soft Power? The Round Table: The Commonwealth 
Journal of International Affairs, v.105, n. 1, p. 57-65, 2016. Disponível em: < https://bit.
ly/2VrDnrd >. Acesso em: 7 abr. 2020.
THAROOR, Shashi. India as a Soft Power. India International Centre Quarterly, 
v. 35, n.1, p. 32-45, 2008. Disponível em: < https://bit.ly/3c9a6s1 >. Acesso em: 7 abr. 
2020. 
THAROOR, Shashi. Pax Indica: India and the World of the Twenty-first Century. 
Nova Delhi: Pengui, 2012.
THUSSU, Daya Kishan. Communicating India’s Soft Power: Buddha to Bollywood. 
Nova York: Palgrave-Macmillan/Nova Delhi: Sage, 2013/2016.
YAU, Elaine. How Bollywood hit the mark in China. South China Morning Post, dez. 
2018.
